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Summary  findings
A wave of privatization is sweeping the globe, affecting  Various methods for introducing competition in
about  100 countries and adding up to an average of  network industries (sketching broad regulatory
more than $60 billion a year in business in the past  requirements along the way).
decade. The challenge is to ensure that privatization  * Competition  for the market, and bidding for
yields clear benefits.  franchises.
Empirical studies suggest that ownership change by  *  Options for competition for existing networks,
itself will often yield results, especially when it reduces  including "open access" arrangements, "pooling" of
government interference. But the regulation required in  homogeneous services such as electricity and natural gas,
areas of natural monopoly can become overly intrusive  and "timetabling" (the competitive determination of
and undermine progress. Real competition is required to  service delivery for nonhomogeneous services that need
generate sizable and lasting welfare improvements.  to be sent to specific endpoints).
But in infrastructure sectors, the introduction  of  *  Options for expanding competitive systems by
competition is complicated by the existence of complex  decentralizing investment in new network capacity.
transport  and communications networks. Debate about  *  The option of allowing competition among multiple
whether  and how to introduce competition in network  networks.
industries is sometimes heated.  *  The implications of these options for the sectors and
Certain questions recur: Will continuing regulation be  for financing industry expansion.
needed? Whether  and at what terms will private finance  In case of doubt,  he contends, policymakers should not
be forthcoming?  restrict the entry of competitive firms in such networks.
Klein argues that policymakers need to understand  If they do, entry restrictions should be subject to an
how competitive forces can be brought to bear in  automatic test after a set period, and reviewed for costs
network industries. He explains:  and benefits.
* Common principles that are often lost in "technical"
debates about specific sectors.
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Infrastructure privatization. A wave of infrastructure privatization activity is currently
sweeping the globe affecting about 100 countries and amounting annually to over US$60 billion of
business on average over the past decade. It has become increasingly clear to policymakers and
firms alike that a  major challenge is to  ensure that such privatization activity will yield clear
benefits. Existing empirical studies suggest that ownership change per se will often yield benefits
particularly  where  it  leads  to  reduced  noncommercial  government  interference.  However,
regulation that is required in areas with natural monopoly features may become overly intrusive and
undermine  the  progress  made.  To  generate  lasting  and  sizable  welfare  improvements  the
introduction of real competition is required.' Effective competition requires that firms can fail. This
in turn tends to require private ownership as public firms may more easily count on being bailed
out. It is in this sense that private ownership may be most clearly necessary for achieving lasting
efficiency gains.
Questions policymakers pose. Many reforming governments want to employ competitive
solutions.  By  way  of example consider recent World Bank  experience with  reforming client
governments. Key questions were:
- Should we allow completely free entry into all telecommunications services or is
there reason to fear uneconomic duplication of investment and services?
- Should we introduce competition in power generation by unbundling generation and
allow trade in transmission capacity rights such that decentralized bargaining over
such rights determines dispatch?
- Should we provide an exclusivity period for gas distribution systems or allow free
entry?
- Should we  separate rail track from  rail service operations and  let the  latter be
competitively supplied or should we grant monopoly franchises combining track
and service operations?
- Should we introduce auctions for landing slots at airports?
- Should we require that port concessionaires  not be controlled by shipping lines so as
not to bias access opportunities for other shippers ?
- Should  we  provide a  measure  of bankruptcy protection for  private  competing
airlines to ensure essential service ?
A background  paper  summarizing  the  results  of existing  empirical  work  is being  prepared.- 2 -
Uncertain answers. The answers often remain unclear and continue to be subject to-
sometimes  heated  - debate. First, there  is the  debate  about whether competition  should  be
introduced  and  if  so  how.  An  example of  the  former  question is  whether  free  entry  into
telecommunications makes sense given growing economies of  scale in  fiber optic cables.  An
example of the latter is the great (and expensive) confusion about California's power sector reform
debate  about  wheeling  (decentralized trade  in  electricity  contracts)  versus  poolco  (system
optimization via central dispatch based on price bids by generators). Second, there are the questions
about the regulatory implications of sector deregulation. Will regulation remain necessary, will it be
easier or more complicated? Third, policymakers are worried whether private finance will come
forth on reasonable terms to fund new investment in competitive segments of a network, where
investors may face new and unclear risks, which they are not used to.
The need for clarification. The presumption of this issues paper is that the time is ripe to
clarify and illuminate the debates about the competitive forces that may be brought to bear on
network industries. The idea is not to provide perfect answers, but - in a reasonably dispassionate
and intuitive fashion - to provide policymakers with broad perspectives that may help them orient
themselves. The goal is to  identify the key  considerations and arguments and  how they hang
together, to clarify what is known and what is not. Examples are drawn from various sectors to
obtain richer insights by relying on what amounts to a larger set of (quasi)-counterfactuals. Such a
broad view of competition in networks should in particular bring out questions about the nature of
networks and the nature of competition, which may more easily be  glossed over in "technical"
sector-specific debates.
The basic structure of this paper. First and foremost ways of introducing competition in
network  industries2 are discussed. Basic regulatory requirements are sketched along the  way.
Implications for financing industry expansion when competition is introduced are sketched at the
end.
The discussion on competition starts by sketching the concept of natural monopoly giving
rise to the debates. The natural monopoly issue is then contrasted with a benchmark view of "ideal"
competition in networks. This benchmark serves as a the key goal underpinning policy reform
efforts, which aim at introducing effective competition in network industries. In particular the role
of market-driven prices and the need for spot-markets is highlighted. This is then followed by a
discussion of ways of introducing competitive forces in the following order:
Competition for the market
i)  bidding for monopoly franchises (e.g. solid waste collection services);
2 The term network  industry  is used in a broad  sense.  For examnple,  the whole  road  transport  system  including  vehicles
is considered  a network,  even  though  each vehicle  is obviously  physically  separable  from the road  network.  One may
also think about all sort of activities  that match suppliers  and customers  and incur  some sunk costs in the process  as
network activities, e.g. marketing. However, the  discussion  here centers on  network industries in  transport,
telecommunications,  energy  and water/sanitation.- 3 -
Competition over existing networks
ii)  'open access' - liberal policy towards access to monopoly segments and
interconnection  requirements  (e.g.  in  natural  gas,  rail  or  telecommunications
systems);
iii)  'pooling'  - introducing competition in  existing networks where central
dispatch optimizes network-wide service delivery of a fairly homogeneous service,
while end-users and  input suppliers contract competitively (e.g.  in electricity or
natural gas);
iv)  'timetabling' - competitive determination of optimal service delivery in
networks where non-homogeneous services need to be sent to specific end-points
(e.g. auctions for airport landing slots or railway routes);
Competitive system expansion
v)  decentralization of investment decisions for new capacity in networks (e.g.
new transmission lines for electricity); and
Competition among multiple networks
vi)  conditions under  which  competition arnong  several networks or  bypass
within a network may be desirable, including reliance on substitute or intermodal
competition (e.g. for freight transport). This  is followed by a  discussion of the
desirability of erecting policy barriers to entry, including arguments about cross-
subsidies and financing of infrastructure  projects.
2.  NATURAL MONOPOLY  AND IDEAL COMPETITION  IN NETWORKS
CONTRASTED
The  natural  monopoly argument.  Some  types  of  networks  such  as  water  pipeline
systems, railroad track, gas pipelines, and power transmission lines exhibit technical characteristics,
which appear to make them natural monopolies. In other words it would be a waste for society to
have several parallel networks of this type compete with each other. In fact, if they were competing
only one firm would eventually survive. Indeed, competing municipal gas and water systems have
not survived in the 19th century. Competing 19th century railroads in the United States ended up in
monopoly  areas  carved  up  in  private  agreements  among  the  companies.  Competing  gas
transmission  companies  in  Germany  concluded  demarcation  agreements  among  themselves
delineating respective monopoly areas for each company.3
3The  natural monopoly  argument  does not imply that complete  systems  of infrastructure  need to be owned and
managed  by a single firm. Complete  systems,  e.g. a telephone  or gas system  may be composed  of several small
interconnected  systems  that each are the sole provider in a particular  geographical  area. Examples  are telephone- 4 -
Potential competition. If entry into a market is easy and if it costs little (low sunk costs)
then there will be potential competitors who will enter the industry when prices are "too high" and
compete prices down again. An example may be trucking markets. If a single firm in one area or
line of business starts charging excessive profits,  other firms may simply use trucks available
elsewhere and compete the excessive profits away. The equivalent example of airplanes illustrates
that the fixed costs (the cost of the airplane) may be high, but hit-and-run entry is still feasible
because the investment (the airplane) can be moved to alternative use in other markets.
Sunk costs. However, when specific investments with no economic alternative use  are
required to operate a network, then investments are sunk as in the case of a water pipeline. 4 If the
incumbent raises prices a new firm may enter but it risks losing its investment if the incumbent
lowers prices again or the incumbent may be driven out of the market. In both cases some water
pipelines may lie idle eventually - potentially wasteful duplication from the point of view of
society it seems. Once only a single supplier remains it has the power to earn excessive profits. This
gives rise to an issue of economic regulation so as to limit profits to normal levels and pass more
benefits to consumers.'
Physical characteristics of networks, the extent of natural monopoly and the scope for
competition. In recent years received notions about which network industry or segments thereof
are  truly  natural  monopolies  have  been  challenged  repeatedly.  Deregulation  efforts  have
successfully expanded the scope of competition in various sectors with network characteristics,
such as airlines, trucking, natural gas, power and telecommunications.  By the same token the extent
of economic regulation in these sectors has shrunk, although in some cases it has become more
complicated as a result.
In some sense the various policy experiments have tried to peel away competitive layers
from regulated networks and lay bare the true remaining natural monopoly. How one can peel off
competitive segments varies from sector to  sector depending on technical characteristics of the
sector. Nevertheless it helps to  look at the problem from the perspective of several sectors to
sharpen the understanding of what is involved in expanding the scope for competitive forces and
their nature in differing sectors. However, before exploring this agenda further it may be useful to
state the importance of establishing functioning spot markets.
franchises in Finland and Hungary (56 small systems), gas transmission in Germany, electricity distribution, water and
sewerage systems. railways in the United States, road systems managed by differing regional government entities etc.
It is of  course physically possible to remove the sunk investments in the network, i.e. water pipes  in this  case.
However, this would not generally be economic.
5 Theoretically one could forgo regulation if society were prepared to accept monopoly profits, which would always be
limited to some degree by competition from substitute products. However, this is usually politically unsustainable. We
nevertheless see that a number of sectors are not or only partially subject to economic regulation. Such is the case when
substitute product markets exist and society for some reason accepts possible remaining monopoly rents e.g. railways
vs. trucks (United States, Argentina) and natural gas vs. petroleum  products (Germany, Finland, Hong Kong).-5 -
Ideal competition in network industries. The creation of a spot market yielding prices
that  reflect  market  conditions  is  essential  for  the  introduction of  effective  competition.  A
competitive spot market yields a set of prices maximizing welfare - absent externalities. This
requires inter alia that the market is large enough to sustain a sufficient number of competitors to
avoid oligopolistic behavior and that prices are free to vary by time, location and customer. When
there are such market prices, regulation in this market is no longer necessary as competition will
limit market power of market participants and yield efficient outcomes.
The box below shows an 'ideal'  system in the case of electricity. Note, however, that even
some parts termed 'natural monopoly' here could be potentially competitive. For instance, some
experts believe pooling and dispatching are potentially competitive.
Box 1:  Competition in Electricity
Generator I  Generator 2  Generator 3  Generator4  4  Potentially
Competitive
Pooling &  ,Vatural
Z  l  Dispatching  Monopoly
|Transmission & Distribution  |
Potenlially
Supply  Competitive
This diagram shows  what elements  of the system  are potentially  competitive  or
natural monopolies.  In this diagram,  supply,  that is, billing,  customer  service,
and bulk purchase  of electricity,  is potentially  competitive,  as is the generation
business. The 'wires' businesses  high voltage  transmission  and low voltage
distribution,  are natural monopolies.  Pooling  (operation  of the market)  and
dispatch  are also considered  natural  monopolies,  although  some believe  that
these  two are potentially competitive  through  decentralized  contract  trading.- 6 -
Furthermore spot markets allow buyers and sellers to buy and sell at short notice, to make
up for shortfalls or excesses that may occur for whatever reason. This in turn allows buyers and
sellers to conclude meaningful long-term contracts that even out price fluctuations in the spot
markets and yield predictable payment and supply obligations (See box below). Long-term
contracts also facilitate the financing of investments. 6





In many commodity and financial markets buyers and sellers face a
variable spot price. A wide variety of contracts exist to allow players to
'hedge'  the risk of buying and selling at a variable price. This diagram
explains the basic mechanism in the simplest case.
In a long-term contract, a buyer and a seller of a commodity agree to
eliminate revenue risks caused by variations in the spot price through
fixing a price at which they will contract. In the diagram above, there is
a variable spot price (SP) and the buyer and the seller decide to fix the
price at which they will trade (CP).
In a simple long-term contract a constant quantity (q) is traded.
(I) If SP > CP then the seller pays q x (SP - CP) to the buyer
(2) If SP < CP then the buyer pays q x (CP - SP) to the seller
(3) If SP = CP then no money changes hands
If both parties are buying and selling the amount q in the spot market
then the financial flows in the financial contract will exactly offset the
price variations in the spot market and essentially fix forward the price
at which the trade is concluded.
Efficient  spot  prices  are  essential  for  decentralizing  investment  decisions  in  the  network
infrastructure itself. For this to be possible spot prices in a network need to reflect the capacity
constraints of the network - given safety and other operating requirements. One way of thinking
about this is that a bottleneck facility segments the market in several sub-markets as long as there is
congestion. Prices reflecting sub-market conditions will reign at all relevant nodes in a network (see
6 For long-term contracts to exist one needs to allow "speculators" i.e. players who develop liquidity in a market and
hence support the development of contracts with a long maturity period.-7 -
box below). When capacity constraints are not binding at all, node prices will not differ and the
whole system functions as one unsegmented market. 7
Box 3:  Congestion Prices
For simplicity,  think  of two  markets,  East  and West, each
comprising a series buyers and sellers -- assume all
transport  costs  are zero.
Example  1: No Transport  Link
If no transport  link exists  between  the two markets  then  the
two  markets  operate  completely  separately,  i.e. prices and
quantities  are determined  by supply  and demand  conditions
in each market.
Example  2: Limited  Transport
If there is a limited  transportation  capacity  link  then  there
is partial  integration  of the two markets. If the price is the
E< W then it will pay suppliers  to divert  units  to W. The
prices in  the two  markets  will  tend to converge.  If after  the
capacity  of the link is exhausted  there is still  a price
difference,  then the difference  is known  as the 'congestion'
price.
Example  3: Unlimited  Transport
If transportation  capacity  is infinity,  suppliers  and
customers  are effectively  competing  in the same  market.
Consider  the  example of  a  power  system  where  electricity flow  through  the  grid  is
optimized by a central dispatch system. Here contracts for power supply need not be concluded by
a  single, central  power  company. Contracting can occur  directly and  competitively  between
generators and consumers subject to the constraint that total power input into the system equals
total  output  (including  losses).  Producers  bid for dispatch,  consumers  bid for supply.  The dispatch
center  optimizes  system  operations  subject  to  operating  norms  about  system  stability,  reserve
margins,  etc.8 With  complete  pricing flexibility,  the outcome  is a system  of spot prices,  varying  by
time and location in the network (node prices) which reflect both the valuations of suppliers and
See Schweppe  (1988)  for a full discussion  of the applied  theory  of congestion  pricing  for power  systems.
8Such  markets  for electricity  have  - with varying  degrees  of sophistication  - been established  for power in Chile
(1978),  the United  Kingdom  (1990),  Argentina  (1992),  Norway  (1992)  and  Australia  (Victoria)  (1994).- 8 -
consumers as well as the operating norms and capacity constraints of the system.  The spot prices
will also provide appropriate signals for capacity expansion in generation. When spot prices are
expected to rise and remain high enough to fund the cost of building and operating a new power
plant, a new plant will be built. In times of overcapacity on the other hand spot prices will drop to
low levels and investment will be discouraged (theoretically the price should follow system short-
run marginal costs which could vary widely).'0
To hedge price fluctuations in the spot market, generators and consumers can conclude
long-term contracts  for  power delivery at  agreed prices. To  be  able to  fulfill  such contracts
producers must be able to purchase or sell power in a spot market. This is equivalent to trading
arrangements in markets like that for crude oil. For exarnple, a producer of crude located in the
Middle East may honor a sales contract to a customer in Brazil, by purchasing crude oil on coming
from Venezuela on the spot market while selling crude from the Middle East in the spot market that
may ultimately serve Europe. The contract for delivery is then separable from the actual flow of the
product. This is always possible when there are multiple supply sources for the product traded and a
spot market exists. The existence of the spot market makes it possible to honor long-term contracts
efficiently and thus also to use them to secure debt financing.
An  efficient node  pricing system  provides  signals  for  new  investment  in  "transport"
capacity expansion. The difference between node prices reflects the cost of congestion and system
losses. As differences between node prices grow, investment in new capacity relieving congestion
becomes economical.  In  theory it  should be  possible  to  allow investors  to  come forth  with
investments in transmission infrastructure  in response to expected node price differences.
If it is possible to create an efficient spot market that allows operating and investment
decisions in all of the network industry to be decentralized i.e. left to market forces, then all that
remains of regulation is "normal" anti-trust or competition policy, which should help guard against
excessive concentration in relevant markets and collusion.
As in the case of any other market, competition over networks will not be effective if the
total system is so small that there is only a small number of competitors, e.g. in a power system
with only two or three generating stations. Even when there is a large number of producing plants
they must not all be owned by a small number of firms to minimize the incentives to collude and
thus  undermine  the  effectiveness of  competition. Anti-trust rules may  be  needed  to  prevent
collusion or mergers between the plants. But if unregulated investor responses are sufficient to take
care of efficient network expansion, then there is no issue here that is different from those in any
other market with workable competition.
9Such  a market may be called a 'smart market', in this case embodied in the optimizing dispatch system. A 'smart
market' is effectively any computer - aided market that uses a series of algorithms to facilitate the market-  clearing
process.
10 A relevant analogy is the market for aluminum plants, i.e. plants with high fixed, sunk costs operating in a world
market with flexible spot market prices reflecting market conditions.- 9 -
Care needs to be taken in analyzing the scope for competition properly. For example, the
shape of  the bottleneck part of  the network e.g. the transmission system, which may  include
"treatment" facilities (e.g. gas or water treatment plants), may effectively create a series of small,
segmented markets so that many suppliers are able to exercise monopoly power in "their" part of
the market.
As we will see, it may be that in some cases competing networks may sensibly be used to
establish workable competition. In other cases it may ultimately be possible to create effective spot
markets by means of "smart" markets. The smart (computer-based) market is an auction system,
where producers and customers of a good or service bid to produce or consume the good or service,
subject to the constraints imposed by the bottleneck facility including any rules governing system
stability or  safety or the like. The smart auction system explicitly takes these constraints into
account and optimizes the use of the bottleneck facility as it exists.
The smart market thus simultaneously optimizes utilization of the bottleneck elements of a
network and generates a system of spot prices based on bids for delivery and purchase of services
by multiple producers and customers, who require the network for service delivery. It may thus be
that the only "real" natural monopoly element left is the establishment and operation of the smart
market itself, whereas new investment in network expansion can be left to "the market" based on
the spot prices generated at all nodes in the bottleneck parts of the network.
Politically it will be important that customers accept the bewildering and fluctuating array
of prices that is required for effective spot markets in network industries. The world of such prices
is almost diametrically opposed to often preponderant notions of uniform system-wide flat rates for
services of network industries. A flavor of what consumers could expect is provided by airline
pricing practices in a deregulated system like the United States, where prices may differ by seat, by
cancellation option, by the time of booking and are constantly adjusted by airlines on the basis of
evolving  demand  for  seats  and  competitors'  behavior.  The  liberalized  long-distance
telecommunications market in the United States provides another example of the kind of market
that might confront consumers.
If the choices are extremely complex, it is possible that brokers will come into the market
and provide a simplified 'menu'  of choices for consumers. This is in effect what banks do for
customers: provide an  interface to the financial markets and provide marketable packages for
customers. An example is the provision of fixed rate mortgages: these are backed by derivatives or
other hedging instruments in the financial markets, but customers do not need to know this. They
simply face a choice about whether to fix their mortgage rate for a number of years and what the
cost of this action will be.- 10-
3.  INTRODUCING COMPETITION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES
3.1  Competition for the Market
Franchise bidding
It has been argued that one way of bringing competitive forces to bear on natural monopoly
segments of an industry is to delineate the monopoly franchise and auction it off to  the bidder
requiring the lowest price from consumers (Demsetz 1968). However, prices and related terms of
the franchise (often known as a concession  I)  will have to be adjusted as time goes by in response
to new events. There are two options to adjust prices, either by rebidding the franchise periodically
or by instituting price regulation of the "traditional" kind. Only rebidding promises an escape from
a return to a standard natural monopoly case requiring regulation. Indeed, monopoly franchises for
such activities as  solid waste collection have been auctioned off periodically with documented
efficiency gains over regulated systems.
However, if there are significant sunk costs involved assets need to be transferred at the end
of the franchise period under a system of rebidding. These assets will have to be valued. One way is
to let new bidders bid a value for the assets. For that they need to have information on future prices,
which need to be given exogeneously. That could only be done by a "regulator" as - by definition
- there is no market setting the price(s). The other way is to value the assets and let the bidder
offer the lowest price to consumers. The valuation, however, needs to compensate the incumbent
such that incentives to invest and operate efficiently are maintained. Such a valuation exercise is
almost identical to a rate review by a regulatory agency (Williamson 1976). If the value for the
assets is too low the incumbent will have weak incentives to invest in and maintain the system. If
the value is too high it will lead to excessive prices for consumers under the new bids.  12
De facto, there will always be challenges to  incumbents in monopoly franchises. Such
challenges may be infrequent and may not follow any prescribed set of rules, but no incumbent will
forever be  efficient and politically acceptable. The difficulties of  setting appropriate franchise
periods and of valuing assets - explicitly or implicitly - at the end of the franchise period will
" There  are a variety  of other  similar  forms  of contracts,  for instance  leases,  BOTs  etc.  The differences  between
contracts  depend  on the degree  of responsibility  of the private  operator  (for instance  whether  they are responsible
for financing  new investment)  and whether  the contract  is to operate  existing  infrastructure  or to build  new assets.
12 One alternative  mechanism  to avoid these problems  was developed  in Argentina  and used for concessions  in
electricity  distribution  and transmission.  In this scheme,  the incumbent  and the entrant  bid. If the entrant  outbids the
incumbent,  the value of the bid is paid to the incumbent.  If the incumbent  wins then no money changes hands.
Theoretically,  this system  should  overcome  some  of the problems  described  above.  The difficulty  with  this scheme  is
that the customer derives no benefit from these periodic competitions.  This scheme therefore  either has to be
accompanied  by regulation,  i.e. the customer  receives  the benefits  of competition  through periodic  price reviews  in
which  case the scheme  does not eliminate  the need  for regulation,  or a proportion  of the proceeds  of the auction  have  to
be returned  to the customer  at the auction,  e.g. 25% of the value  of the auction  is returned  to the customer.  This then
raises  the traditional  problems  of franchising,  i.e. the danger  of less  than  full compensation  for the transfer  of assets  and
the potential  advantage  of the incumbent  in  bidding  for  the franchise.-11  -
then  be  encountered  by  necessity.  Historically,  occasional  albeit  infrequent  challenges  to
incumbents in monopoly franchises have often yielded at least temporary reductions in prices and
efficiency gains (gas distribution in  19th century Canada, water concessions in France, power
generation plants in the United States after 1978).
By placing limits ex ante on franchises and requiring some form of competitive bidding for
renewal of the franchise, Governments will ensure that regular challenges are possible. If many
different franchises exist there will be constant competition for renewal of some franchise, e.g. if
there are 10,000 water franchises with an average length of 20 years, 500 will come up for bid
annually. As long as firms are allowed to operate franchises in several jurisdictions they will then
have an incentive to maintain some reputation to be able to be prequalified for bidding at renewal
time. The incentive to maintain reputation will somewhat reduce the temptation to slacken efforts in
franchises they  currently  hold.  However, during  the  life  of  long-term franchises economic
regulation will continue to be required and the valuation problem at the end of the franchise period
will remain.
3.2  Competition over Existing Networks
3.2.1  'Open Access'
Open access to the bottleneck facility. 14 Some times, segments of a network industry have
been identified as potentially competitive, e.g. long-distance services in telecommunications, power
generation  in  electricity  systems,  gas  production  in  natural  gas  systems  etc.  However,  for
competition in one segment to be effective, access to remaining natural monopoly-type bottlenecks
is required. As long as the network owner(s) are not engaging in predatory behavior competitive
suppliers  will have  access to  the bottleneck facility provided there  is  available capacity.  An
example might be rival gas suppliers using a single gas pipeline (the bottleneck facility). In the case
where the pipeline owner has no interest in supply, it will always pay for them to allow additional
access. The marginal cost and hence the price of capacity will be close to zero. For interruptible'5
service, gas suppliers and their customers can thus count on available transport capacity and there
will be an effective competitive spot market for interruptible service with the possibility of writing
longer-term hedging contracts.
When  capacity  constraints  are  binding,  there  will  have  to  be  rationing  of  access
(interconnection)  to the bottleneck. This can be achieved efficiently without regulation. An efficient
Such  reputational  effects  have  been  shown  to exist  in the only  larger  study  of the issue  that  we know of i.e. a review
of experience  with  the results  of competitive  award  of cable  TV  franchises  in  the US (Zupan  1989).
t4 This is sometimes known as 'common carriage'.
5  ' Interruptibility'  in gas refers to the ability of the pipeline owner to stop services to customers on interruptible
contracts when demand is high. The conditions on which Interruptibility can occur e.g. number of times, length of
interruption etc. varies by contract. Unless the demand for gas is relatively constant, therefore, it is likely that some
types of interruptible contracts will be possible in every gas system.- 12  -
outcome would  be approximated if the owner of the gas pipeline could charge prices for the
transport of gas that reflect the difference between consumers' willingness to pay and producers'
marginal cost. The allocation of resources would then be optimal in the sense that the cheapest
producers would sell gas to the consumers with the highest willingness to pay, i.e. the ones valuing
gas the most.
In this case, the owner(s) of the bottleneck facility would receive monopoly profits. There is
therefore again the need for regulation of prices charged by the owners of the bottleneck facility for
access and of prices for any services they provide to final customers of the network industry. This
could for example be achieved by way of a "global" price cap on a basket of prices for all services
rendered by the bottleneck facility including the price of access (Laffont and Tirole 1994).
Open access and interconnection rules
So far it has been argued that a market for capacity rights will not eschew the need for
regulation. This was on the assumption that owners of the bottleneck facility do not engage in
predatory behavior. However, there may be incentives for them to do so particularly when they
themselves own part of the competing supply facilities e.g. power plants or gas fields or long-
distance telephone transmission facilities. In those cases they may seek to raise access prices to the
network to  prevent competitors in the non-monopolistic segments of the network from gaining
business and eventually to drive them into bankruptcy.
To prevent this  from  happening regulators may impose certain access obligations and
matching  pricing  principles  to  prevent  owners  of  monopolistic  segments  from  engaging  in
predatory behavior. This rationale for regulation is thus different from the attempt to simply limit
profits in the monopolistic segments. The former regulation is there to enable competition "over the
network" to take place and to prevent owners of the bottleneck facility from reaping excess profits,
whereas the latter is there only to limit profits of the bottleneck owner. Of course, the limitation of
profits on the bottleneck facility may well be the reason why its owner might want to establish and
exploit market power in the competitive segments. This then argues to impose limits on vertical
integration and separate ownership in the bottleneck facility from that in other parts of the system
- a time-honored way of ring-fencing the natural monopoly element since the time of canals in
18th and 19th century United States where at times canal operators were not allowed to operate
barges on the canal.
As soon as access rights and prices are to be regulated, there may have to be non-price
based rules rationing access, such as first-come first-served (at the regulated access price). It is then
no longer clear whether the outcome will be optimal. In particular, there may be excess demand for
capacity, whiclh  may lead to excessive network expansion, if the network owner is obligated to
provide access at given (low) rates.
A well-known benchmark pricing rule for the regulator trying to preserve competition over
networks is the efficient component pricing rule. It essentially says that the access price charged by
the  bottleneck owner  should  compensate for  the  full cost  of  providing network  access to  a
competitor in the competitive segment. That full cost consists of the marginal cost of access as well- 13 -
as any losses of profits that may be the result of new access. Clearly the bottleneck owner will then
maintain its prior profitability, whether that included excessive profits or not. New entry will bring
benefits to consumers under this rule if the new entrant is more efficient and can deliver a final
service for a total price that is less than others charge including for exarnple a vertically integrated
firmn  with control over the bottleneck. For the vertically integrated firm it will be economical to shut
down its own capacity in the competitive segment, because it will be compensated for this through
the access price.- 14 -
Box 4:  The Efficient Component Pricing Rule
[Town  R  oute  AB_  Town ]  B  Route  BC J  Town 
Marginal Cost  Marginal Cost  Joint Cost  Access Price*  Price
(AB)  (BC)  (Average Cost
over AC**)
Incumbent  5  5  10  20
Efficient  4  15  19
Entrant
Inefficient  6  15  21
Entrant
This is a simple example of the Efficient Component Pricing Rule developed by Baumol as a principle for
setting access prices. In this example, due to Baumol, a vertically integrated incumbent offers a rail service
between towns A, B and C. An entrant wants to develop a rival rail service between towns A and C but has
to pay for access to the vertically integrated incumbent for its bottleneck service between towns A and B
(route AB) and will provide the service itself between towns B and C (route BC).
The costs of the service are as follows. There is a marginal cost (assumed constant) of service for each leg
of the route AB and BC of 5. In addition, there is ajoint cost of service of 10 (an average fixed cost
incurred by the incumbent for operation of the entire rail network) so that the average cost of the service AC
is the sum of the marginal costs and the joint cost, ie 20. The incumbent charges the average cost of the
service (20) and the entrant charges a price equal to its marginal cost over BC and the access price to AB.
As illustrated in the table above, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule states that the correct access price to
charge the entrant for the bottleneck service (route AB) is the sum of the marginal cost of access to the
bottleneck AB which equals 5 and the joint costs of service 10 (the opportunity cost of entry to the
incumbent). The efficient access price is therefore 15.
This example is illustrated by two entrants. The first, the efficient entrant, has marginal costs of 4 over the
route BC. It therefore can profitably enter at the ECPR access price of 1  5 and undercut the incumbent with
an average cost of 19, which is less than the incumbent's average cost of 20. If an inefficient entrant has
marginal costs for the route BC of 6, then it will have average costs of 21, ie more than the incumbent and
hence will not enter. In other words, the correct access price induces efficient entry. An access price less
than the ECPR (in this simple example) will induce inefficient entry.
*  Access Price (under ECPR) = MC(BC) + JC
**  Average Cost (to incumbent) = MC(AB) + MC(BC) + JC
Average Cost (to entrant)  MC(BC) + AP
The efficient component pricing rule defines in  effect an  upper limit for access prices,
because it still allows the incumbent vertically integrated firm to make excessive profits - as in the
past. A lower bound is set by the marginal cost of granting access to the network. The marginal cost- 15 -
may, however, fail to compensate the network owner for fixed costs of maintaining the network.
Such costs should also be incorporated in the access price possible in the form of a two-part tariff
-with  a  fixed charge covering network establishment costs (including the capital cost  of the
network owner) and a variable one covering the short run cost of access. In effect such an access
price would be equivalent to the efficient component rule without compensating the incumbent for
loss of excessive profit.  16
Procompetitive regulation. Sometimes access rules and prices are used to provide an
advantage to  new entrants relative to the incumbent. The rationale for such entry assistance is
presumably similar to that for infant industry protection, i.e. ultimately based on arguments about
learning externalities. It would also follow that such protection should be limited in time.
Resale of capacity.' 7 Users of the bottleneck facility may buy rights to use capacity and
may be allowed to resell them in various ways. The question is what type of competition such a
resale market can provide. Resale can yield more complex pricing of capacity than may be allowed
under regulation for the primary sale of capacity by the bottleneck owner. Also parties not having
access to capacity because of some type of quantitative rationing may be able to obtain access
through purchase in the retail market. If pricing in the retail market were unregulated, then the
ultimate pricing structure would be the same as that of a monopoly selling directly. Regulation
would simply create a rent for "primary dealers," i.e. companies buying capacity rights from the
owner of the bottleneck. Therefore, for regulation to be effective it has to apply to resale of capacity
in monopolistic segments as well. Consequently, prices for capacity can not be set in a free market
for capacity rights based on access regulation.
While the creation of  an  open  access system  is plagued  by many  detailed regulatory
challenges it can serve effectively to promote competition in competitive segments of the industry.
An increasing number of examples across sectors illustrate the benefits of creating open access
systems in rail, telecommunications and gas. Note that this issue is often combined with issues
associated with the creation of new duplicate networks, for instance in telecomnmunications  i.e. the
price at which a new long distance fiber-optic network can access the local network to provide a
full service (see section 4. 1).
16Kay J (1995) argues that recent advances in accounting theory, in particular the activity based costing rule have to a
large extent eliminated the distinction between costs that can easily be allocated to a  specific activity and general
overheads. Further progress could lead to a situation where access prices can "simply" be based on the marginal cost of
access provision without the need for further fixed cost compensation.
17  This is also known as 'contract carriage'.- 16-
3.2.2  'Pooling'-Open  Access Without Predetermined Rights to Use Capacity
The open access rules outlined above attempt to enable competition over the network by
selling rights to network capacity to competing firms on a non-discriminatory basis. However, it
may  be  difficult to  define, adjust and  enforce such  rights in  a  manner  that  allows  effective
competition to take place. For example, in power systems a complete set of access or capacity
rights may be undefinable. Power flows through a network according to Kirchhoff's law.  What
capacity is used or unused at any moment in any part of a power system is a function of all physical
flows throughout the system and not a function of bargaining or individual transport decisions. It
may not therefore be practical to define capacity or access rights for power systems. What can be
done, however, is to have a central dispatch system that optimizes system flows, instantaneously
matching supply and demand. There is open access in such a system in the sense that the power of
winning bidders will always - and by definition - be dispatched. The use of capacity is then
flexibly determined by the dispatch system. There is no need for trade in capacity rights e.g. in
response to short-term shutdowns of power plants and no need to compensate holders of capacity
rights for the effect of power flows on available capacity.
This solution to competition over power transmission systems has by now been tried in
several countries. Chile introduced a competitive power pool in  1978. when its system was still
publicly owned. Least-cost dispatch continues to be on the basis of audited costs of power plants,
not on continuous price bids by generators. Bidding thus takes place implicitly as costs are reset.
The United Kingdom introduced a competitive bulk power market on the basis of half-hourly price
bids in 1990. However, both Chile and the United Kingdom continue to suffer from high market
concentration in the generation segment and a  lack of barriers against vertical integration. The
Argentine system introduced in 1992 places strict limits on horizontal and vertical integration thus
effectively creating the conditions for workable competition. However, so far "bids" are based on
audited cost data rather than price bids by generators. All the foregoing systems set transmission
prices in an essentially administrative  way, i.e. they do not allow congestion prices to be established
by the smart market. Norway introduced its competitive pool in  1992 and is trying to generate
prices by the smart market including congestion prices. Most recently the Province of Victoria in
Australia is introducing a  competitive bulk market for power. Results from the introduction of
competition remain encouraging. In the United Kingdom productivity of generators has roughly
doubled within four years, including for the remaining public nuclear power operator. Productivity
in the industry segments not subject to competition i.e. distribution has also increased, but only by
about 10 percent. In Argentina, the switch to a private competitive system quickly resolved all of
the urgent problems of  power shortages and  created a  situation of temporary excess  capacity
essentially because the new generating firms efficiently rehabilitated and operated existing plants.- 17  -










The price in the Pool in England and Wales is determined on the day ahead of
operation. The price is determined by ranking the bids (the price at which it will
generate and the quantity  it can generate at that price) of each generating turbine
(genset) in the system. The price is determined by taking the highest price bid needed
to meet expected demand in every half-hour period in the day ahead as shown in the
diagram above. The Pool price is therefore determined for every half-hour period on
a given day. A sample of prices taken from Financial Times is shown below.
Note that this is a very simplified explanation of the mechanism. In practice, there
are other elements to the price and the bids are complex non-linear functions.
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It  might be  argued that one could define and enforce capacity rights in  systems  with
directed flow like natural gas transmission. However, trades may still be too complex to obtain
efficient gas transmission on the basis of trade in capacity rights. In effect, the notion of trade in
capacity rights entails that a complete path for the transport of gas from seller to buyer be obtained
through purchase of a series of capacity rights, which are available at the time they are needed.
Constructing such a system of "straws" through a pipeline system that efficiently matches capacity
rights  with  energy delivery may  be  so complex that efficient  solutions may not  obtain.  The
experience of the deregulated U.S. gas industry is suggestive in that there are efficient spot markets
for interruptible gas supply, i.e. supply flowing in times when pipeline capacity does not impose an- 18 -
aggregate constraint on the energy trades that are possible. Such markets are still rudimentary for
trades when capacity constraints are binding, i.e. when capacity has value. A conceptual solution
currently being investigated in the U.K. gas industry is to use a central optimizing dispatch system
as in  the case of power  mentioned above. It remains to  be  seen whether such a  system can
technically be put in place.
One might argue that rather than relying on a single optimal dispatch system one could
conceive of a system where transport rights through a pipeline are originally allocated to several
owners, who can than sell these rights. Private brokers could construct optimizing models that
would match energy and capacity trades in the way a dispatch system would. The result of these
trades would then yield the instructions to the actual dispatch center. For electricity such a system
would simply have high transaction costs unless different brokers were to  develop competing
optimizing  systems  and  unless  such  competition  between  optimizing systems  were  to  yield
sufficiently large benefits to offset the cost of the whole brokerage system. '8That includes the issue
of whether instructions generated by competing optimizing systems could generate a feasible and
efficient set of instructions for the dispatch center.
Under the solutions described above the transmission systems remain natural monopolies
and require regulation. There is no need to design an interconnection regime as discussed in the
previous section. Rather regulation of the cost of utilizing the transmission system appears to be
equivalent to regulation of any bottleneck transport facility, e.g. regulation of a monopoly railway
franchise. Regulation may thus  be  a  little less complex than that  required in  the case  of  an
interconnection regime, which  does not  rely on  market  structure regulation under  which  the
bottleneck facility is vertically separated from the competitive segments.
3.2.3  'Timetabling'-Establishing  Optimal Delivery Schedules
In the case of power or natural gas it does not matter, whether a customer receives electrons
or molecules produced by the supplier with whom he has contracted for delivery, because the
product shipped is sufficiently homogeneous. A different issue arises in transport ventures like
airlines, railways or telecommunication, where a freight or passenger or caller need to  reach a
particular customer or point in the network. This imposes a more complex set of constraints on the
network optimization problem than the "simple" requirement that total inflows match total outflows
(including storage). This problem is equivalent to the previously discussed issue of constructing an
optimal set of "straws" for natural gas systems  - and adjusting it efficiently in the face of changing
supply and  demand conditions. However, for the  sectors now considered the  issue cannot  be
eschewed as in the case of the previously discussed industries.
For example, if one  were to define rights to  use the rail tracks and  allocated them  to
multiple parties,  secondary trading should yield the optimal set of  paths  (straws) through  the
network that maximizes welfare given the valuations by producers and consumers for the service in
18Logistics  networks  are a case  where "brokers"  compete  with  competing  optimizing  methods.  Markets  for trucking
and taxi  services  also see competing  dispatchers.- 19 -
question i.e. person or good x delivered to point y at time z. The optimal set of paths forms the
optimal  deliver  schedule or  timetable. The  problem  is whether  an  optimal timetable  can be
generated  through  decentralized  bargaining  or  whether  a  smart  market  is  needed  that
simultaneously generates the optimal set of paths through the network and the prices for all the
paths contained therein. Because the value of each right to use a piece of track at a particular time is
dependent on what happens with all adjacent pieces of track (all pieces are indirectly adjacent to all
others) one may need a  single optimizing smart market.'9 A further issue is whether short-run
adjustments to the optimal schedule e.g. due to mechanic breakdowns or other emergencies can be
made  in  a timely manner by the smart market/dispatch center or whether the  loss of  vertical
integration translates simply into higher transaction costs.
While the structure of the problem may be clear it may also be too complex to solve for
many systems.  20 Potential applications are conceivable in railways and airport slot auctions (to
obtain an optimal timetable pairs of slots need to be auctioned i.e. a path through the "network" of
airports.)  Sweden and  the United  Kingdom are  currently  investigating whether such  smart
markets can be established for railways. Experiments with such smart markets have been conducted
in experimental laboratory settings.22
Implicit timetables
Timetables need not be preannounced. Optimal routing may be obtained through smart
markets in other ways. Ideally, transport and congestion prices could be determined through
competing segments of the transport network each of which competed to provide the service.
Through demand and supply conditions, prices on individual segments could be set
independently and competitively. These systems have been the subject of experiments,
particularly in the case of gas and electricity where joint competing owners of transport
infrastructure, i.e. specific gas pipelines have been proposed. 3
19 Once a set of paths  is established  the right  to use the paths in a specified  way e.g. by running  a container  train over
set of tracks  could  be auctioned  to  - in  this case-  train  service  companies.  The right  to use  capacity  on the trains  can
in turn  be allocated  by price  or queuing  mechanisms  or a mix thereof.
20 We know  now  that in the case  of electricity  a smart  market  can be made  to work, in  which  paths  through  the network
need  not be explicitly  defined.  Setting  up smart markets  that can derive  optimal  sets  of paths  would  imply  also  that, in
principle,  capacity  rights  could  be traded  "in"  the smart  market.
21 In the future remote  intelligent  traffic  management  systems  could also bring the world of smart markets  to road
transport.
22 See McCabe et al (1989)
23 See Cara Funk (1992). This system would essentially work by splitting up individual pipeline ownership into a
series of individual owners competing to provide the transport service. Although there may be some difficulties
monitoring the contracts and entitlements, this would not necessarily be impossible using advanced metering and
computer systems.- 20 -
How might this work in practice?  Two examples are provided here. The first is of a
telephone network. Optimal use would be obtained if users of the system faced prices that lead
them to use the system optimally. For pricing in a phone system one might  - as a thought
experiment -imagine  the following system. The caller would dial. The system optimizes
(numbering plants and switching facilities in the case of telecommunications)  would then determine
the optimal path at the desired time and quote a price that would appear on the phone. The customer
could then "conclude" the contract by pressing a "yes" button or abort the call attempt. This would
yield a system of spot prices on the basis of which longer term contracts could be established
enabling callers to have assured call rights at given prices at certain times. In a sense the price
schedules of the phone companies mimic this "long-term" market directly without explicitly letting
callers make a spot market. Indeed, the information over the Internet already is conducted on a
similarly decentralized basis with individual 'packets'  of information being sent across different
routes of the network.
The second example is the road network. In theory, each road, or even lane of a road
could be under separate ownership with each segment profit maximizing given the constraints of
competition from other routes and transport substitutes. Subject to the prices that arise from these
routes, individual shippers, logistics firms and other road users will decide on the traffic flows,
hence establishing an 'implicit'  timetable. Note that this is simply the price 'dual'  of the quantity
rationing which exists today, certain routes are more congested than others and the time costs
associated with heavily used routes determine traffic flows on a decentralized basis.
Why are some routes decided on a decentralized basis and others on a centralized basis?
Clearly the answer is not necessarily to do with the cost of congestion which  is substantial in
roads and still the subject of 'decentralized'  timetabling. Part of the answer, at least historically,
may be to do with the cost of short-term supply/demand imbalances which are catastrophic in
systems  that  have  been traditionally  centrally  dispatched,  i.e. railways  with  the  danger  of
collisions and gas and electricity with the danger of explosions or blackouts respectively. The
other answer clearly is that timetabling and dispatching grows more complex as the number of
players/routes etc. increases making 'central dispatch' infeasible in the case of transport over the
road  network.  New  computer  and  monitoring  systems,  however,  may  reduce  the  need  for
centralized  dispatch  in  future  in  the  other  infrastructure  sectors,  particularly
telecommunications.
3.3  Investment in Expansion of the Bottleneck Facility
Under the various schemes for organizing competition over existing networks users of the
network will  somehow have to  pay  for investment and  operating costs of the  network.  It  is
24 The airline  industry  exhibits  some  features  of this decentralization  as well. In a deregulated  system  airline  seats are
continuously  repriced  to reflect  demand  and supply  conditions.  Customers  have  a choice  of buying  in the spot market
- sometimes  literally  bidding  over seats in overbooked  aircraft  - or buying  longer-termn  contracts  that guarantee  a
seat at a price.  However,  as mentioned  before  airline  routes  are not yet competitively  allocated.  Therefore  seat pricing
currently  optimizes  given a route  system  i.e.  given a timetable.- 21 -
notoriously difficult to allocate such costs in an economically meaningful way. The danger thus
exists that sub-optimal charges for the bottleneck facility e.g. power transmission will result in bad
location of  facilities  in  competitive segments (power  plants) or  bad  transmission  expansion
decisions (Newbery 1995).
Decentralizing investment decisions
The more information is reflected in prices the better investment decisions can be and the
more scope there is for decentralizing decisions. We have above considered arguments why price
(and simultaneously scheduling) systems may require a -potentially  unique -smart  market, i.e.
a natural monopoly of sorts. But once prices are established they can then guide decentralized
decisionmaking. If one can obtain a price system that reflects opportunity costs by time as well as
location then  it should in  principle be  possible to  decentralize all trades and  also  investment
decisions.
Consider the above railway path/airport slot auction problem. Suppose a pure price system
could operate that  would yield different prices at different locations and times for the  use of
capacity train or airplane capacity. These prices would feed back into the valuation of complete
paths. Prices would then reflect congestion costs. This is equivalent to node pricing referred to
above for power systems.
At some point the cost of congestion should lower the value of sales to producers so much
that it would pay to invest in congestion-reducing infrastructure. Equivalently the value of calls or
travel might be so reduced. Will this lead to efficient decentralized investment decisions? Network
customers e.g. power plants would need to  form expectations about future node prices and the
difference between them i.e. congestion costs. That may not be more difficult than assessing future
market conditions in any other competitive market.
Network customers or groups of customers or developers on behalf of customers could then
invest in extra capacity to relieve congestion. However, it may often be difficult to determine who
benefits to what extent from the new capacity. For example, the owner of the existing "path" or a
part thereof may neglect maintenance and still not suffer much, because the new investor(s) have
relieved congestions sufficiently. Or some firm could not be persuaded to join the consortium but
still has access to the system e.g. because access is rationed by price only. The question is whether
sufficiently strong consortia can be formed that feel they can ignore the beneficial effects on others.
In  reality  some  such  attitude  always  prevails, e.g.  when  a  firm  constructs its  own  captive
infrastructure thereby relieving constraints on others. The builder(s) of new infrastructure capacity
benefit by collecting higher sales prices and by receiving future congestion rentals between the
nodes that the new capacity connects.
Where  free rider problems are  serious, whether in  the "maintenance  example"  or the
"consortium example" the key is to wTite  contracts ex ante between the concerned parties that can
be enforced ex-post, e.g. maintenance obligations could be contractually specified or payment
obligations under the consortia and other participants in the power system could sue when contracts
are  breached.  What  remains to  be  shown  is  that  the  solution to  the  free  rider  problem  is- 22 -
substantially different from "regulation." Also, if solution of free rider problem increases incentives
and opportunities to collude, is anti-trust sufficient to deal with this threat? 25
One may ask: If new investment could be decided upon in the above decentralized way,
why could trade in that capacity not occur in the first place? Maybe the answer is that a smart
market -not  decentralized bargaining  -is  first needed to establish prices that can then support a
decentralized investment response.
3.4  Remaining Natural Monopoly and the Role of Competition Policy
In  a sense the scheduling mechanism is the one that grants access to  a system that  is
otherwise operated, maintained and expanded in a decentralized and competitive fashion. In some
sense scheduling is equivalent to a permitting system that allows firms to operate in an otherwise
reasonably competitive market. Scheduling should therefore always be (vertically) separated from
the  rest of the  system and probably be  run as  a non-profit organization, which  represents all
participants and in particular the users. That is in analogy to "governmental authorities" or self-
regulatory bodies, which govern and operate permitting or licensing systems in other parts of the
economy.
By vertically separating the core natural monopoly element, namely scheduling from the
rest of the system there can also be more latitude for allowing vertical integration in the rest of the
system. If scheduling/dispatch is carried out separately, the actual ownership of the transmission
part of the network will not provide much in the way of monopoly power unless the owner can
obstruct competitors by  scheduling maintenance work in  anti-competitive ways. While vertical
unbundling may thus be not so important after all, a sufficient number of competitors (horizontal
unbundling) may be  required to achieve lasting benefits of competition. In many ways this  is
similar to basic principles of competition policy elsewhere i.e. vertical integration is not much of a
problem as long as the integrated company has no monopoly power in any part of the vertical
supply chain.
4.  COMPETING NETWORKS AND POLICY BARRIERS TO ENTRY
4.1  Competition Among Networks
Natural monopoly elements in the scheduling function or the limit of smart markets.
The foregoing arguments suggest that the hard  core of natural monopoly is the smart market
whether in its incarnation as dispatch or timetable optimizes. When will there be a  single smart
market or "scheduling system?" In general, scheduling is necessary when temporary congestion is
extremely costly i.e. svstemwide black-outs in the case of electricity and problems to a lesser extent
in gas networks. It is in these networks that a 'hard core' natural monopoly in terms of centralized
scheduling is likely to remain.
25 The answer to this question will also determine whether cotenancy schemes such as "competitive  joint ventures" are
significantly different from "straight" regulation.- 23 -
In  a  world of  complete information "traffic flows"  should be  centrally scheduled  and
dispatched accordingly worldwide and across different types of networks - what the just-in-time
logistics network tries at the level of competing firms, should be done centrally for the world by a
(benevolent and  efficient) scheduler. The whole world would thus be a natural monopoly with
regard to scheduling.
But as we know, there may be a lack of benevolence and efficiency in monopolies and the
problem is probably too complex anyway -just  as the somewhat equivalent proposition of central
planning that wanted to reduce the chaos of markets and its attendant costs. 26
We also see a number of competing networks e.g. petroleum product distribution systems
competing with natural gas systems or railways competing with trucks, cases where the theoretical
benefits  of  complete and  integrated scheduling are probably less  important than the practical
benefits from competition among networks. Competition is most useful where the central planning
problem is hardest i.e. where uncertainty and/or complexity is great. There are thus dynamic or
informational benefits from incomplete scheduling, which allows competition on the basis of some
level of "redundancy" or duplication. Such redundancy can - by definition  - only be suspected
but not unambiguously identified. Redundant capacity is necessary for new things to be tried out
and for monopolistic behavior to be checked.27  For example, the introduction of competition for
long distance services in Chile's telecommunications industry in 1993 led to market entry by eight
long-distance carriers and a fall in prices by 50 percent by 1995.
The  shifting  economics of  scheduling. But  as  knowledge and  practices  evolve  the
(ambiguous) boundaries of where the realm of redundancy starts and that of tight scheduling ends
will shift. Practical questions that arise and have no set answer are: should port dockage slots be
auctioned in pairs like airport slots to benefit from tighter scheduling? Or because in most parts
oceans are still uncongested there might not be significant benefits from tighter scheduling, which
should normally arise from reduced investment requirements. The obverse may be true with roads,
which are currently inefficiently priced and not naturally abundant. For example, if roads were to be
priced electronically a lot of long-distance freight traffic might shift to rail, where it can be more
tightly scheduled (higher throughput) and causes less maintenance costs.28  Scheduling economics
26 See for example Vickers (1994) which outlines  the trade-offs in terms of a simple model where the incentive benefits
of a number of competing firms is weighed against the duplicated fixed costs of entry.
27 Once upon a time the socialist critique of market economies pointed to the allegedly wasteful duplication in chaotic
markets, of which marketing appeared to be an obvious case. But while there might be some duplication in markets, the
pressures generated by chaotic competition to work hard, to learn and to innovate apparently outweigh many costs of
duplication. The theoretical benefits from coordination or planning on the other hands are difficult to achieve when
matters get complex and markets tend to be better at generating useful information than planning bureaus. In other
words what some call dynamic benefits of competition appear much more important than static allocational benefits in
many settings.
28 The channel tunnel provides a real world example that when costs matter it is cheaper to put trucks on wagons than
to build  a tunnel  for trucks.  This  does not essentially  depend  on the higher cost for ventilation  under a truck-on-road-24 -
also appear to be behind the debate of whether one should allow free entry into urban public
transport e.g. bus systems or whether routes or set of routes should be (competitively) awarded as
monopoly franchises. Likewise the empirical finding that free entry into solid waste collection
services is less efficient than competitive award of monopoly franchises is likely to result from the
advantages of tighter scheduling under the monopoly franchise.
As it is never quite clear ex-ante what the extent of natural monopoly is. So it might be
useful to let markets determine whether monopoly is indeed natural. If a natural monopoly is truly
such then only one firm will survive under unregulated  competition for a franchise.
Competition is often valuable for the very same reason that it is impossible to quantify
ex ante that it will be valuable. A review of the deregulation experiments in the United States
highlights the role unexpected new ways of doing business have followed deregulation and led to
welfare  gains  (Winston  1993).  If  one  could  predict  innovation,  whether  organizational  or
technological, any old protected monopolist could match the competitive outcome. It is precisely,
because one cannot predict innovation that competition is beneficial and by the same token one
cannot ex ante quantify its benefits.
The view is also supported by specific examples of the behavior of protected monopolies. In
many cases administrative entry restrictions have clearly retarded investment and better service -
witness the behavior of monopolists like India telecom. At the same time the monopoly holder has
often de facto charged market-clearing prices to customers by asking for bribes or other special
payments for example for the installation of telephone service.
Many such monopolists were and are public enterprises and the lack of profit motive for the
firm as a whole may explain their lack of dynamism. But other examples show that the private
profit motive alone may not be sufficient to instill a monopolist with dynamism. As long as Ghana
had only one cellular company the company invested slowly and planed to expand only as retained
earnings easily allowed financing of expansion. As soon as a second cellular operator was allowed,
the incumbent started to invest aggressively ahead of the previously announced schedule.
Essentially all of the preceding arguments against erecting policy barriers to entry revolve
around what some call dynamic benefits of competition, i.e. benefits originating in better incentives
to expend effort, leam, and innovate.
system,  but on the possibilities  to increase  throughput  with  tighter  truck-on-rail  scheduling  and smaller  turnel diameter,
because  safety  margins  are less  - in other  words  two  benefits  of tighter  "scheduling".- 25 -
4.2  Costs of Competition and Policy Barriers to Entry
In some  cases policymakers will be  reluctant to  allow free entry for seemingly  sound
reasons. For example it may be difficult to see the benefits of allowing multiple water companies to
tear up roads and sidewalks or to allow multiple garbage collection trucks to fight for the trash of
the same community. However, in the first case  - if the costs of tearing up the "street" are clearly
imposed on the private firm including a tax for externalities such as disturbing traffic and general
quiet - it is hard to see why anybody would enter the market, particularly if corporate take-overs
were allowed, unless the new entrant had a superior solution for the problem of delivering water. In
the second case it is again questionable why anybody would enter the trash collection market if
prices could  be  freely  set.  An area  monopolist should be  able to  offer better  terms  than to
everybody than competing firms. unless competition yielded other benefits. Competitors would at
all times be free to offer a new set of contracts to area residents and if they could sign up enough
clients, they would oust the incumbent. 29
But there may still be costs to letting markets pass the verdict on natural monopoly:
- The process of establishing the natural monopoly outcome may be wasteful and costly e.g.
when water companies competed in the 19th century by laying parallel lines. Today studies suggest
that competition among solid waste collection companies for the  same customer group  is less
efficient than competition for (temporary) monopoly franchises for solid waste collection.
- There may be an unsustainable or suboptimal outcome from the competition for a natural
monopoly under a policy of free entry. Suppose a single efficient firm is the cheapest solution to
supply the whole market, e.g. a water company that is constrained to charge uniform single price
tariffs in the service area. Suppose further that production technology is such that average costs are
minimized when two-thirds of customers are supplied, but are rising again when more customers
are to be connected. A new entrant could then offer to supply two-thirds of the customers at a lower
price than the incumbent and would drive him out of business. In this case one third of the market
would remain unsupplied.3 30 Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994) use this argument to explain why
service provision in 19th century water and gas systems was often limited.
- Regulation may provide incentives for excessive bypass (Laffont and  Tirole  1990).
Vertically integrated incumbents would tend to try charging excessive access/interconnection fees,
which will by the same token provide excessive incentives to bypass the system.
29 In cases like trash collection, where sunk investments  are minimal, a reasonably effective alternative to free entry is
to auction off monopoly franchises in short intervals on the basis of the  lowest price offered (Demsetz-Chadwick
auction).
3  This  could  be avoided  in  case  price  discrimination  is allowed,  because  the  incumbent  could  charge  two  thirds  of the
customers  the  minimum  average  costs  and  more  to the  rest  so  that  the  new  entrant  cannot  offer  better  terms.- 26 -
- Network  externalities  may  create either  excess  inertia (too  little  investment  while
everybody waits for others to invest in the expansion of the network, which becomes more valuable
the more it connects users to others) or excess momentum (too much investment as firms try to
establish a first-mover advantage) (Tirole 1988, Economides 1994, Katz and Shapiro 1994)
The basic tradeoffs. Altogether the arguments for erecting policy barriers for entry into
natural  monopolies  point to  excessive costs  of  service delivery under  free entry regimes  or
undersupply. To evaluate such arguments ex-ante one would need to have a view on the magnitude
of  such costs and  compare them to  the likely losses of efficiency resulting from restraints on
competition. Such a tradeoff is by definition impossible to  quantify ex ante, but the following
general considerations may hold.
- Costs  of establishing networks. Competition between networks may be
desirable if the sunk costs of establishing those networks are "small" relative to the
cost of the ultimate service, e.g. lines in telecommunication networks.
- Government  capability.  In  cases  where  government  capacity  to
benevolently and efficiently recognize natural monopoly and establish barriers to
entry is weak it is more likely that entry should not be limited by policy (award of
monopoly franchises or exclusivity periods etc.). Likewise when monopoly firms
are either owned or regulated by a "weak" state the case for allowing competition is
strengthened.
T  echnical change. When technical change is rapid it will be more difficult
to  circumscribe the domain  of natural  monopoly and  the  dynamic benefits  of
competition will be large.
- ~Complexity  of networks. As argued above in the discussion of scheduling
there  is  likely to  be  more value in competing networks the more complex the
network  is.  e.g.  logistics networks. This  is simply a  case where the costs  and
benefits of maintaining a monopoly are little known and where competition is most
needed to find innovative solutions.
4.3  The Political Economy of Natural Monopoly
Unavoidable political decisions. Most of these arguments are difficult to translate into
practical measures that allow governments to assess the likelihood of wasteful duplication. It  is
harder still to assess the magnitude of dynamic benefits that need to be weighed against the costs of
duplication. The easiest  may still  be  cost  function studies  as  suggested by the  contestability
literature. But  this  says nothing about  how to  factor in  dynamic  benefits  from competition.
Arguments about network externalities and games among a small number of players can go both
ways -in  favor or against entry barriers  - depending how the games are specified. The foregoing
arguments thus mainly  characterize the  logic of  some arguments. At  the end  of  the  day-
politically established biases will be the decisive factor. Good policy should ideally take such- 27 -
biases into account guarding against arguments to  restrict entry that do little more than protect
special interests.
Government  subsidized  duplication.  The  same  governments  that  advocate  entry
restrictions  ostensibly to  reduce  wasteful duplication tend to  tolerate and  subsidize duplicate
networks of major proportions - witness transport networks for example rail and road. In the 19th
century competition from rail led to a decline of the private road industry in the United Kingdom.
On the continent, France for example, the government maintained the roads with subsidies in the
face of competition from rail. Today the reverse holds and many governments heavily subsidize
rail. Governments also tolerate highly inefficient price structures and usage of infrastructure. For
example, inefficiencies in road and airport usage pricing have been estimated to amount to around
US$15 billion each in prices of 1995 (Small, Winston, and Evans 1989 and Morrison and Winston
1989).
Entry  restrictions motivated  by the  private  and  political  search  for  rents.  Entry
restrictions on the other hand have often been set at the behest of incumbents and to keep out new
technologies. A case in point is the fight of gas companies against power companies around the turn
of the century. Entry restrictions are particularly hard to undo when the boundary of a protected
company coincides with  the political jurisdiction that grants the protection. There are obvious
benefits from collusion between the political powers and the firm, which would be reduced if the
firm operated across jurisdictions and several political entities had to collude to extract monopoly
rents. Municipal monopoly franchises may be particularly difficult to undo as history seems to
suggest.
A variation of the theme are arguments in favor of entry barriers that are based on the need
to  maintain cross-subsidies. Certainly cross-subsidies can only  be  sustained if  competition  is
somehow limited and so-called cherry-picking restricted. But the same subsidy can be provided
explicitly and based on competition-neutral funding sources. Monopoly profits in one part of the
network are not the only source of "tax" revenues.
Another argument for entry barriers is based on attempts to lower the ostensible cost of
capital for network service providers. The natural incentive for investors, investment bankers and
short-term revenue-maximizes in  Government is  to  argue for  entry barriers when  privatizing
infrastructure firms or issuing concessions to  build new facilities. Thus the call for exclusivity
periods, long-lasting concession terms etc. Indeed, monopoly rights will lower the ostensible cost
of capital and render financing "easier." But they do so by shifting risks to the customers not by
reducing risk overall, unless the entry barriers help avoid a social cost of the type outlined above, in
which case the ease of finance and the cost of capital is not the critical argument.
Experience from the last century shows that investments not protected by entry barriers
were in fact funded. Today we also see that new investments in competitive segments of network
industries will be financed, e.g. power plants in competitive markets in Argentina, Chile, and the
United Kingdom. What is no longer possible though is project finance based on long-term power
purchase agreements with the ability to attract long-term debt in  for highly leveraged projects.
Rather financing patterns resemble more norrnal corporate finance patterns with low leverage, short- 28 -
maturities and on-balance sheet financing by  the sponsor. A  recent case which  suggests that
competition may  effectively stimulate investment and  lower  prices compared to  a  monopoly
franchise  solution is  found in  Chile, where the government allowed two  rather than one  gas
transmission line to be built to supply gas from abroad. The decision to allow a competitor brought
contract gas prices to final users tumbling down by some 20 to 30 percent.
4.4  Basic Policy Rule
As  there  are so many questions about whether monopoly should  prevail and  whether
government is capable of identifying such situations ex ante, maybe the basic policy rule should be:
in case of doubt do not restrict entry and, if you do, subject the entry restrictions to an automatic
test after a  set period of time and require a cost-benefit review to  argue for prolonging entry
barriers.
5.  A SKETCH OF SECTORAL IMPLICATIONS
Depending on the physical characteristics of each "network"  industry ways to introduce
competition will vary in nature and effectiveness and differ in ease of implementation. Broadly
speaking competition is of course easiest to introduce in industry segments, where sunk costs are
unimportant e.g. in the case of many transport vehicles such as ships, airplanes, trucks, taxis etc.
The basic policy solution here is free entry without economic regulation. Matters become more
complex when economies of scale due to  scheduling are important. In those cases it may  be
efficient to award monopoly franchises competitively e.g. for urban bus transport or solid waste
collection services. As long as sunk costs are not important as in the case of buses and garbage
trucks repeated franchise bidding can provide a good level of competition without the need for
extensive regulation. To date positive experience has been gained with competition in all the above
transport industry segments.
Where sunk costs are important, matters are more complex. For electricity and natural gas
systems, which  produce and carry fairly homogeneous products the best  conceivable solution
would appear to  lie in "smart"  competitive pools, wherever a  sufficiently large market can be
created  to  sustain  workable competition.  This  argues,  of  course,  very  heavily  for  fostering
international  trade  in  energy  services wherever  possible.  Competitive  pools  are  still  in  an
experimental stage, but with demonstrated effectiveness and clear promise. The greatest current
challenge is  whether fully flexible congestion price  systems can be  made to  work and  allow
effective deregulation of investment decisions in the transmission and distribution networks. Water
pipeline systems might  also benefit from  competitive pool  solutions, if  and  when markets in
tradable water rights in areas where the price of water is high are allowed to function. However, the
politics of water may impede progress. Competition in water is also made difficult, because water
sources can be quite heterogeneous and economies of scale in water treatment may render effective
competition difficult in many cases.
Smart markets have yet to provide practical solutions to introduce competition in networks
where goods and services are not homogeneous and where starting and end points of network flows
matter. Attempts at solutions are being debated in the context of the Swedish and U.K. railway- 29 -
reforms. But basically the preferred option of the day is some form of open access or common
carriage  system  with  regulation  of  interconnection rules.  This  is  particularly  important  in
telecommunications, but also used in various other networks such as railroads, airports, and natural
gas.
To some extent the search for competitive, unregulated solutions can be facilitated if one
simply relies on competition between "networks," otherwise described as intermodal or substitute
competition. Typically that is an option for railways, which face competition from trucks in many
cases. One  can also rely on  competition from petroleum product market to  discipline pricing
behavior e.g. in the natural gas market. Thus is the case for natural gas in Finland, Germany, and
Hong Kong (for large users). Large electricity contracts in Germany are also unregulated. Indeed,
international comparison of regulatory regimes shows that the rail and natural gas sectors are most
likely  to  remain  unregulated tend to  rely  most  on  substitute  competition to  provide pricing
discipline.
Telecommunications services are more and more exposed to competing wireless services
and  in  many  cases  competing line-based networks are being established as  the cost  of  such
infrastructure falls. Further technical progress may thus obviate the need for regulation. Countries
with  limited government capability to  regulate can already rely on competition form  wireless
services to provide basic consumer protection.
The toughest regulatory challenges remain  in  electricity, water, airports and  roads.  In
electricity the solution may lie in the above mentioned competitive power pools. In water the
effective introduction of competitive forces is a  fair way off, although conceptually similar to
power  pools.  Road  management  may be  revolutionized as  electronic traffic  management  in
conjunction with road (congestion) pricing becomes more widespread as a result of current tests in
countries such as Italy, Norway, Singapore, and the United States. Airport landing rights auctions
are  still  awaiting the  arrival of  appropriate smart markets, which  would  also  be  required to
efficiently manage road networks and decentralize investment decisions in these networks.
The  key  to  the  introduction  of  new  solutions  will  remain  technical  progress  in
telecommunications and telemetry. In the telecommunications  industry itself technical change holds
out the hope for workable competition among networks. In other industries such as transport and
energy telemetry and telecommunication advances combined with computer-based smart markets
are crucial for new solutions.- 30 -
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